GAO Questions Future of Contractors in Iraq
The Government Accountability Office released a report on March 24th, part of which dealt with the various issues facing the future use of contractors in Iraq. I have extracted the relevent material here.
You can find the full report Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight here.
Background
The Departments of Defense(DOD) and State (State) have relied heavily on contractors in Iraq to support troops, civilian personnel, and reconstruction efforts. As of October 2008, DOD estimated it had more than 163,000 contractors under its contracts. Contractors have provided security services, life support, and facilities maintenance, among other things.
Issue
Over the past 6 years, contractors have played a key role in U.S. efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. As the U.S. and Iraqi governments implement the November 2008 security agreement that governs the presence, activities, and drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq, DOD and State will need to assess the type and level of contractor support needed during the drawdown of U.S.forces.
At the same time, both departments will need to overcome challenges in providing a sufficient number of trained personnel to effectively manage and oversee contractor performance. As the administration further defines its plans for Iraq, it will need to consider the implications of the changing nature of contractor support, as well as ways to enhance DOD’s and State’s management capacity.
Key Findings
Uncertainties regarding redeployment of contractors.
Maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. government property under the control of contractors may present challenges to redeploying U.S. forces from Iraq. According to Defense Contract Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. From late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces did not include a theater-wide plan for redeploying contractors.
DOD and State Have Had Difficulties Managing and Overseeing Contractors in Iraq
Both DOD’s and State’s ability to effectively manage their contractors in Iraq has been hindered by several challenges. The challenges experienced by one or both of these agencies include a failure to adequately plan for the use of contractors and clearly define their requirements, a lack of acquisition and trained contract management and oversight personnel with experience working in contingency operations, and a lack of policies and procedures.
Further, both DOD and State have had difficulties identifying the number of contractor personnel in Iraq. The lack of visibility makes it difficult for commanders and other senior leaders to make informed decisions on the food, housing, and security needed for contractors who reside on U.S. facilities.
In July 2008, DOD and State entered into an agreement to use a common database to track contractor personnel in Iraq; however, DOD officials have acknowledged that there are weaknesses in the systems designed to track contractor personnel in theater.
DOD’s and State’s Capacity to Provide Personnel to Oversee Contractors Remains Uncertain
The lack of a sufficient number of trained acquisition and contractor oversight personnel continues to present a considerable challenge to both DOD and State. This has contributed to higher costs and schedule delays and has hindered operations. For example,
• In September 2008, GAO reported that the lack of qualified personnel to oversee contracts, including those providing linguistic services andmaintaining the military equipment used in Iraq, hindered efforts to oversee and, as necessary, correct poor contractor performance in a
timely manner.
For example, in many cases, the contractor presented military equipment that failed government inspection and had to be repaired again at additional expense and time to the government. DOD personnel indicated they lacked the resources to perform data analyses,
identify trends in contractor performance, and improve quality processes.
• In July 2008, GAO raised concerns about whether DOD could sustain increased levels of oversight on its private security contractors. GAO found, for example, that the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), which had been recently tasked to provide contract
administration over private security contracts, increased the number of its personnel in Iraq by shifting personnel from other locations and had no strategy for sustaining this increase.
• In January 2009, State’s Office of the Inspector General reported that the department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not have a strong control environment to ensure its primary security service contract in Iraq is effectively managed due, in part, to frequent changes in management personnel and understaffing combined with a drastic increase in workload. In response, State noted that it planned to increase the number of contract oversight personnel in Iraq for its private security contract and develop additional policy and guidance to better manage these contractors.
Level and Nature of Future Contractor Support Needs to Be Assessed
As the drawdown of U.S. military forces occurs, DOD will need to assess the proper mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, and contractor personnel during this transitional period. Our prior work has shown that the nature and relative degree of contractor support can change as the military’s mission changes.
For example, in Bosnia and Kosovo, contractors assumed responsibility for certain support functions that had been previously performed by military personnel. Moreover, State’s reliance on contractors may increase as the department currently depends on DOD to provide some services.
The U.S.-Iraq security agreement complicates this assessment because it changes the conditions under which contractors operate. For example, the agreement includes several provisions that affect U.S. contractors working for DOD, such as providing the Iraqi government the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. contractors in the enforcement of criminal and civil laws. Similar agreements could also affect U.S. contractors working for DOD, particularly State’s security contractors.
Oversight Questions
1. To what extent are DOD and State taking actions to improve their ability to track and identify contractor personnel in Iraq? To what extent do the departments know the functions these contractors are performing?
2. What are the desired mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, and contractor personnel in light of the planned drawdown of U.S. forces? What actions are needed to achieve this desired mix?
3. What process is DOD using to assess the impact of the November 2008 security agreement and its implementation on DOD’s use of U.S. contractors to support deployed forces or other key functions? What plans has DOD developed in the event that contractors providing essential services withdraw their employees?
4. Is DCMA’s workforce sufficient in terms of size and skill level to support contingency operations without degrading its ability to oversee contractor performance in the United States and elsewhere?
5. Have DOD and State (1) assessed whether the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq will increase its reliance on contractors and (2) taken action to ensure they have sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel?
6. What action is State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security taking to ensure the effective oversight of its security contractors?
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4 Responses to “GAO Questions Future of Contractors in Iraq”
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Excellent, and thanks for posting that Bill.
I don’t know, I think organizing this stuff is very doable. The reason I say this, is that the federal government has been utilizing contractors for forest fire fighting and disasters for awhile now, and have a pretty good handle on tracking them and their cost. They even apply a standard to their contractors, and it is a universal standard throughout the fire industry.
I think the tracking of contractors and other operations, could totally be modeled after the federal fire services method of tracking. This is from actually watching it in action as a initial attack dispatcher and as a former firefighter(contractor and federal employee). I have seen the war contracting machine, and I have seen the fire contracting machine, and there is no comparison.
Hell, they could even adopt the method of finances and how money is spent on fires or other disasters for contractors. It just kills me how one aspect of government is trying to reinvent the wheel, when another portion is doing just a fine job. Who cares where the idea comes from–if it works, it works?
The funny thing, is that I thought there were contracting problems when I was working in the fire industry. Ha! The war industry is way more screwed up, but it doesn’t have to be. The powers that be, just have to be open to finding the better way and learning from others and from self. And when they have found the model for contracting and tracking, to develop a strategy and implement it like it was a military campaign. But that would take strong leadership to do what is necessary.
And on the leadership note, there are enough studies. We know the problems, there are billions of reports about it, so where is the leadership and drive to make it happen? Seriously? We plan on going big in Afghanistan, and we have Iraq to learn from and remember, so where is the lessons learned and leaders to drive it home? Man this stuff makes me livid sometimes, just because I get sick of journalists and agencies and the tax paying public thinking they are getting a raw deal. I am a contractor, and it pisses me off.
I almost think the government does not want to fix these contracting issues. Don’t they know we are fighting a war, along with suffering from a global recession? Get it done now, or get out of the way, and let someone else lead this assault!! (rant over….)
IF YOU WERE A CONTRACTOR IN IRAQ,COULD YOU PLEASE TELL ME HOW ONE GETS STARTED IN TRYING TO GET INFO TO PAINTING CONTRACTORS.I’M DOING THIS FOR A FRIEND,WHO IS A PAINTER.HE WANTS TO GO TO IRAQ FOR A JOB,IF THE MONEY IS GOOD ENOUGH.COULD YOU PLEASE GIVE ME THE INFO ABOUT WHERE YOU START,WHAT IS REQUIRED,ETC,ETC.THIS WOULD GREATLY BE APPRECIATED.THANK YOU
IF THERE IS ANYONE WHO READS THIS AND HAS ANY INFO THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL,PLEASE FEEL FREE TO SEND AN E-MAIL.THIS FRIEND HAS 25 YRS OF EXPERIENCE AND CAN DO ANY TYPE OF PAINTING. THANK YOU
you know the afghans are still waiting for us to come through on promises we made to the early karzi govt. with respect to rebuilding their infrastructure,,,kabul is a good example,,on one block you have resturats,malls with marble tile floors and all the fine things to offer,then go around to the block behind this and you have shell craters and bombed out buildings with locals living in the refuse and whats left,,ive seen afghan kids eat dirt just to have that false feeling of being full,,